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Economic historians and theorists have made contributions to the literature on 
agricultural  tenancy,  including  theoretical  models  of  the causes and conse- 
quences of farm tenancy and empirical tests using historical data.  I  Sharecrop- 
ping in the postbellum South has received special attention as part of the gen- 
eral reinterpretation of the economic history of that region. The most widely 
accepted view of sharecropping now favorably interprets the relationship be- 
tween landlord and tenant as an “understandable market response,” using Jo- 
seph Reid’s phrase. According to this view, sharecropping minimized risk and 
transactions  costs but did not necessarily  depress productivity or cause soil 
depletiom2 But  the notion  that  sharecropping  was the  source of  numerous 
long-term problems in the South still has many supporters. 
The author acknowledges helpful comments on an earlier draft by D. Gale Johnson, David W. 
Galenson,  Lee J. Alston, and Jeremy Atack. Portions of this paper were presented at the Eco- 
nomic History Association meetings in Montreal, Canada, September 1990. 
1. Some of the important works in the earlier literature are D. Gale Johnson, “Resource Allo- 
cation under Share Contracts,” Journal of Political Economy, 58 (Apr. 1950), pp.  11  1-23;  Steven 
N. S. Cheung, The Theory of Share Tenancy: With Special Application to Asian Agriculture and 
the First Phase of Taiwan Land Reform (Chicago, 1969); Joseph D. Reid, Jr., “Sharecropping as 
an Understandable Market Response: The Postbellurn South,” Journal of  Economic History, 33 
(Mar. 1973), pp. 106-30. 
2.  See, among others, Robert Higgs, “Race, Tenure, and  Resource Allocation in Southern 
Agriculture,  1910,” Journal ofEconomic History, 33 (Mar. 1973), pp. 149-69; “Patterns of Farm 
Rental in the Georgia Cotton Belt,  1880-1900,”  Journal of  Economic History, 34 (June 1974). 
pp. 468-82;  Competition and Coercion: Blacks in  the American Economy, 1865-1914  (Cam- 
bridge, Mass.,  1977); “Sharecropping as an  Understandable Market Response”; “White Land, 
Black Labor, and Agricultural Stagnation: The Causes and Effects of Sharecropping in the Post- 
bellum South,” Explorations in Economic History,  16 (Jan.  1979), pp. 31-55;  Roger L. Ransom 
and Richard Sutch, One Kind of Freedom: The Economic Consequences of  Emancipation (Cam- 
bridge, Mass., 1977); Lee J. Alston, “Tenure Choice in Southern Agriculture,  1930-1960,” Ex- 
plorations in Economic History, 18 (July 1981). pp. 21 1-32;  Alston and Higgs, “Contractual Mix 
in Southern Agriculture since the Civil War: Facts, Hypotheses, and Tests,” Journal of Economic 
History, 42 (June 1982), pp. 327-53;  Gavin Wright, “Cheap Labor and Southern Textiles before 
1880,” Journal of Economic History, 39 (Sept. 1979). pp. 655-68. 
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The modern debate is a reformulation  of  an older one between those who 
supported  “the speculator thesis” and those who supported the “agricultural 
ladder thesis.”  The speculator thesis  held  that  speculators  and large estate- 
holders took advantage of  federal land policies to concentrate  landholdings 
and exploit tenants. The agricultural ladder thesis viewed tenancy as a viable 
and efficient economic institution, a rationally chosen rung on the ladder from 
farm laborer to farm owner.  The ladder thesis  dates back to the nineteenth 
century and was subsequently espoused in studies by the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture in the 1910s and the 1920~.~  During the Great Depression,  how- 
ever, the speculator thesis gained adherents whose opinions filled the pages of 
the report of the Special Committee on Farm Tenancy in 1937.4  The specula- 
tor view also dominates works by noted agricultural historians,  such as Paul 
Gates and Fred Shannon. The ladder thesis, however, was rejuvenated by two 
other well-respected  historians  of  America’s  farmlands, Allan  Bogue and 
Clarence Danh~f.~  Traditional studies relating to either thesis focused on the 
resource endowments of landlords and tenants. Recent research on postbellum 
southern  sharecropping  enrich the analysis by affording greater attention to 
other variables such as risk and transactions costs. 
A  second  debate concerning the efficiency  of  production  under different 
types of landholding has also received considerable  attention.  According to 
one economic theory,  a share renter will  not supply the efficient amount of 
inputs (except when the contract stipulates the exact amount to be supplied) 
since the share renter chooses an outlay on inputs at which the share of  mar- 
ginal revenue equals marginal cost. This is the famous doctrine of  inefficiency 
of sharecropping  espoused by economists from Adam Smith to Alfred Mar- 
shall.6 A farmer on a short-term lease, moreover, will have no interest in the 
long-term condition of the property  (unless given a compensatory  payment) 
and will concentrate on activities that yield  immediate benefits. Economists 
more recently have endeavored to formalize the conditions under which share 
renters  behave  as efficiently  as owner-operators.  Beginning  with  D. Gale 
Johnson’s influential work, Steven Cheung, Joseph Reid, and others have ar- 
3. For an early statement of the speculator thesis, see William Kent, “Land Tenure and Public 
Policy,” American Economic Review, 9 suppl. (Mar. 1919), pp. 213-25;  however, see also papers 
by W.  J. Spillman, and by Richard T. Ely and Charles J. Galpin, and the discussions of  them that 
appeared in the same issue, pp. 170-212,226-32. 
4.  U.S. Special Committee on Farm Tenancy, Farm Tenancy: Report to the President’s Cornrnir- 
tee, prepared under the auspices of the National Resources Committee (Washington, D.C., 1937). 
5.  Paul W.  Gates, Frontier Landlords and Pioneer Tenants (Ithaca, 1945);  and essays contained 
in Gates, Landlords and Tenants on the Prairie Frontier: Studies in American Land Policy (Ithaca, 
1973); Fred A. Shannon, The Farmer’s Last Frontier: Agriculture, 1860-1897 (New York, 1945); 
Allan G. Bogue, From Prairie to Corn Belt: Farming  on  the Illinois and Iowa Prairie  in  the 
Nineteenth Century (Chicago, 1963); Clarence H. Danhof, Change in Agriculture: The Northern 
United States, 1820-1870 (Cambridge, Mass., 1969). 
6. For a good summary of the history of thought on farm tenancy, see William B. Bizzell, Farm 
Tenancy in the United States, Texas Agricultural Experiment Station, Bulletin No. 278 (College 
Station, 1921), chaps. 3-6; or Johnson, “Resource Allocation under Share Contracts.” 137  Farm Tenancy in the Antebellum North 
gued that if landlords set their tenants’ intensity of effort, then the productive 
efficiency of  share tenants need not be below that of owner-operators. Reid, 
moreover, provided impressive evidence that a variety of devices were used in 
the postbellum South to specify the tenants’ labor inputs, crop outputs, and 
other details of the production process.’ 
Most of the discussion regarding tenancy in American economic history has 
focused on the South, and until recently tenant farming in the North was rela- 
tively neglected. In separate studies, Seddie Cogswell and Donald Winters 
tried to support the agricultural ladder thesis by analyzing a carefully collected 
micro-data set for northern farms, but their work lacks the theoretical rigor of 
the studies on southern tenancy.8  Further, both Cogswell and Winters concen- 
trated on only one state, Iowa, and gave far less attention to the antebellum 
era. Studies by Jeremy Atack and Fred Bateman, published after most of my 
work was completed, also investigated northern tenancy. While we  use the 
same data set, I use a simultaneous model to explain tenure choice, and  I 
examine the relationship between productivity and ten~re.~ 
This essay explores the determinants of  tenancy, and thus the speculator 
and ladder hypotheses, and the determinants of productivity, and thus the pos- 
sibility of Marshallian inefficiencies. 
4.1  TheData 
My data come from a sample of  21,118 rural households taken from the 
manuscript census of  1860 under the direction of Fred Bateman and James D. 
Foust.’O The sample includes all households in a single township from each of 
102 randomly selected counties, scattered across 16 northern states, and con- 
tains agricultural production data linked to demographic and economic infor- 
mation about the farm operators. 
As I have discussed elsewhere, one can distinguish tenant farmers from 
owner-operators in this sample, even though census takers were not required 
until  1880 to ask farmers if they owned or rented their farms. Farmers enu- 
7.  Johnson, “Resource Allocation under Share Contracts”; Cheung, The Theory of  Share Ten- 
ancy; Reid, “Sharecropping as an Understandable Market Response.” 
8. Seddie Cogswell Jr., Tenure, Nativity and Age as Factors in Iowa Agriculture,  1850-1880 
(Ames, Iowa, 1975); Donald L. Winters, Farmers Without Farms: Agricultural Tenancy in Nine- 
teenth Century Iowa (Westport, 1978). For an historiographical survey see Winters, “Agricultural 
Tenancy in the Nineteenth Century Middle West: The Historiographical Debate,” lndiana Maga- 
zine ofHistory, 78 (June 1982). pp. 128-53. 
9. See Jeremy  Atack  and Fred Bateman, To Their Own Soil: Agriculture in the Antebellum 
Norrh (Ames, 1987);  Atack, “Tenants and Yeoman in the Nineteenth Century,” Agricultural His- 
tory, 62 (Summer 1988), pp. 6-32; ‘‘The Agricultural Ladder Revisited: A New Look at an Old 
Question with Some Data for 1860,”Agricultural History, 63 (Winter 1989), pp. 1-25. 
10. Fred Bateman and James D.  Foust, “A Sample of Rural Households Selected from the 1860 
Manuscript Censuses,” Agricultural History, 48 (Winter 1974) pp. 75-93; Yang, “Notes on the 
Wealth Distribution of Farm Households in the United States, 1860: A New Look at Two Manu- 
script Census Samples,” Explorations in Economic History, 21  (Jan. 1984), pp. 88-102. 138  Donghyu Yang 
merated together with full production data in the agricultural schedules and no 
real property in the population schedules were considered tenants.  I 
Out of  11,940 households with agricultural production  information in the 
sample, 3,382 were excluded from the analysis for one or more of the follow- 
ing reasons: (1) the household was in a slave state, Missouri or Maryland; (2) 
the head  of the household  had  a nonfarm occupation;’* (3) the information 
needed to estimate the farm’s labor input was missing, owing to an inability 
to match the household in the population schedule with the household in the 
agricultural schedule, or for some other reason; (4) the size of the household 
given in the population schedule differed by more than one person from the 
size of the household coded as a separate variable in the sample; (5) improved 
acreage or the value of the farm was not reported; (6) the value of farm imple- 
ments  was  not reported;  (7) there was  no farm output; and (8) there  were 
obvious  recording  errors for key  variables.  After  removing  these  observa- 
tions, 7,740 owner-operated farms and 8  18 tenant farms remained. 
Tenant  farms might  be further  classified,  for instance as sharecropping, 
share renting, and cash renting.13 Because these lease arrangements cannot be 
identified from the census data of 1860, I treat tenants as a single group. Ne- 
glecting the composition  of  the tenantry  could impart a bias if  the type of 
contract  varied  with  the  principal  crop  in  an  area. Typically, however,  the 
terms of share contracts do not appear to have differed very much across re- 
gions.  l4 
Characteristic  features  of  tenants  and  tenant  farms  in  comparison  with 
owner-operated farms are summarized in Tables 4.1-4.3.  Table 4.1 reaffirms 
11. These are the type A and type B farmers, respectively, as defined in Yang, “Notes on the 
Wealth Distribution,” table I. For geographic variations in the tenancy rate see ibid., table 2; and 
Atack and Bateman, To Their Own Soil, chap. 7. 
12. This criterion was absent in my previous work, see Yang, “Agricultural Productivity in the 
Northern United States, 1860,” in Robert W.  Fogel and Stanley L. Engerman, eds., Without Con- 
sent  or Contract: Technical Papers on Slavery  (New York,  1991). There the objective was  to 
explain total agricultural production, whether the farm operator was an owner-operator, tenant, or 
non-farmer by  occupation.  Here eliminating the non-farmer-headed  farms will help distinguish 
tenant farmers from owner-operator farmers. 
13. Studies by the Department of Agriculture during the 1910s and 1920s reported a variety of 
terms under which farms were leased. In the northwestern wheat belt at least six major classes 
of renting were identified; for the dairy farms in Wisconsin and Illinois, two important types of 
tenure were described.These and other studies are summarized in E. A. Goldenweiser and Leon 
E. Truesdell, Farm Tenancy in the United States, U.S.  Bureau of the Census, Census Monograph 
No. 4 (Washington, D.C., 1924). Generally, cash renters were responsible for supply of  labor and 
all working capital. The contribution of productive factors by landowner increased with the share 
of the crop he received. 
14. A Department of Agriculture bulletin in 191  8, based on the study of 258 lease contracts and 
the survey records of 2,907 tenant farms, reported the pattern of renting farms according to crops. 
Although there was considerable variation, the most frequent share of the landlord (when the work 
stock, machinery, and labor were furnished by tenants) was one half for corn, hay, and potatoes 
and one third for wheat, peas, and beans. The products of breeding and milking dairy cattle and 
of raising beef cattle and hogs were divided half and half when the expenses for working capital 
were shared equally (E. V.  Wilcox, Lease Contracts used in Renting Farms on Shares, U.S.  De- 
partment of Agriculture, Bulletin No. 650 [Washington, D.C., 19181). This description, however, 
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Table 4.1  Percentage Tenant by  Age and Region, 1860 
Percentage Tenant 
Age  North  Northeast  North Central 
29 and under  20.3%  18.2%  21.1% 
30-39  12.0  8.4  13.5 
40-49  8.0  7.2  8.4 
50-59  5.3  3.8  6.4 
60-69  4.5  2.6  6.3 
70 and over  0.3  0.0  1.3 
Number of  farms (tenant and non-tenant): 
8,558  3,175  5,383 
Source: Computed from the Bateman-Foust sample. 
Table 4.2  Tenancy Rates by Place of Birth in the Rural North, 1860 
North  Northeast  North Central 
Tenancy  Tenancy  Tenancy 
Birthplace  Owner  Tenant  Rate  Owner  Tenant  Rate  Owner  Tenant  Rate 
Total 
Born in state 
































































































































































Source: Computed from the Bateman-Foust sample. 
an observation found in numerous sources that tenant farmers were younger 
than owner-operators. This finding was frequently used to support the agricul- 
tural ladder thesis, because it was presumed that young renters eventually be- 
came older owner-operators. Is The phenomenon is more conspicuous in the 
15. For recent examples, see Winters, Farmers Without Farms; and Reid, “White Land, Black 
Labor.” 140  Donghyu Yang 
Table 4.3  Average Measures by Land-Tenure Status in the Rural North, 1860 
North  Northeast  North Central 
Owner  Tenant  Owner  Tenant  Owner  Tenant 




Out of state 
Foreign 






Value ($) of 
Farm (F) 
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Farm adjusted for location 
Machinery (K) 
Livestock (V) 
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Note: Total factor productivity was computed by  taking the geometric average of QIL, QIK, and 
QIT with the weights of .63, .05, and .32, derived from the factor shares in total cost. See Yang, 
“Aspects of  United States Agriculture circa  1860’ (Ph.D. diss., Hanard,  1984), chap. 2; and 
“Agricultural Productivity in the Northern United States, 1860,” in Robert W.  Fogel and Stanley 
L.  Engerman, eds., Without  Consent  or Contract:  Technical Papers on Slavery (New York, 
1991), for more detail. 
Source: Computed from the Bateman-Foust sample. 141  Farm Tenancy in the Antebellum North 
long-settled Northeast. But, as I will show, age was actually more significant 
in the North Central region, where tenancy was, in fact, a more effective route 
to ownership because settlement was still in progress. 
As Table 4.2 shows, foreign-born farmers were more likely to be tenants in 
the Northeast than in the North Central region,  in part because in the North 
Central region foreign-born farmers tended to be older than native farmers. 
Immigrants  from English-speaking  countries  had  lower tenancy  rates  than 
other foreign-born farmers.  I6 
Table 4.3 reports the length of in-state residence, another measure relevant 
to the agricultural ladder thesis. The census schedules did not include a ques- 
tion on the years of residency, but one can generate a range for the length of 
time a farm operator could have resided in-state from the age and birthplace 
of his children. In most cases, one can use the age of a farmer born in a state 
as his length of residence.  If the head of  the household was not born in the 
state, then the age of  the  oldest child born  in-state  generally  sets a  lower 
bound on his years of residency, and the age of the youngest child born out of 
the  state sets an upper bound.I7 If  no children were born  in-state, then  the 
minimum residency is zero. Averaging the maximum and minimum gives the 
probable period of residency. Since the range is fairly wide (averaging about 
fourteen years) and family relationships had to be reconstructed  (the census 
did not collect information on relationships among members of  a household 
before 1880), the measure is subject to a substantial error.I8 Even so, it is clear 
that length of  residency was shorter for tenants than owners, a finding con- 
sistent with the idea that tenants eventually worked their way  up to become 
owners. 
Output, input, and productivity (measured according to the procedures de- 
scribed in my study of northern agricultural productivity)  are also reported in 
Table 4.3.19  A brief description, however, may clarify the meaning of the pro- 
ductivity measures. Physical units of crop outputs reported in the agricultural 
schedules were converted  into dollar amounts  (after adjusting for seed and 
feed allowances) by using  1860 national  prices.  Meat output was computed 
16. Female-headed households were minimal, about 4 percent, and there were almost no black 
farmers, so we cannot shed any light directly on the racial issues that are the focus of attention in 
the study of postbellum southern tenancy. 
17. There are very few odd cases in the Bateman-Foust sample, such as intermediate children 
born in-state but first and last born out of state. 
18. A similar measure was employed by  Cogswell, Tenure, Nativity and Age, chap. 6. The 
family relation was reconstructed by following the methods (with some minor variations) of Rich- 
ard A. Easterlin, George Alter, and Gretchen A. Condran, “Farms and Farm Families in Old and 
New Areas: The Northern States in  1860,” in Tamara K. Hareven and Maris A. Vinovskis, eds., 
Family and Popularion in Nineteenth-Century  America (Princeton, 1978). Households were clas- 
sified into three headships: husband-wife headed,  other male headed, and female headed. The 
recognition that all the property-holding  members of  a household were listed before the non- 
property holders saved many unnecessary steps, such as identifying grandparents and stepchil- 
dren. Restrictions on the age differentials between spouses and between mother and children were 
slightly loosened. 
19. Yang, “Agricultural Productivity.” 142  Donghyu Yang 
by multiplying the number of head of each type of animal by their slaughter- 
to-live-weight ratio, their average live weight, and their price per pound of 
live weight. Capital was measured by the value of implements and machinery; 
land was measured  by  the value of  the farm. Capital and land values were 
taken directly from the agricultural  schedules. The locational component of 
the land value was estimated as the difference between the coefficients from a 
linear regression of the value of the land on improved acreage and unimproved 
acreage. The locational component was removed from the value of the farm 
(F)  to create an adjusted land  input (q.  The labor input was estimated  in 
equivalent full hands using the information  in the population  schedules.  To 
convert the farm population into full hands, I used the same age-sex weights 
employed in related  work for southern  labor.  These weights were obtained 
from slave hire-rate profiles, and in turn multiplied by the assumed labor force 
participation  rates of  1.0 for males  and 0.25 for females. Labor input esti- 
mates are likely to be downwardly biased  (as much as 25  percent) because 
hired hands  were  not counted, but  the bias  may  not  be very serious  when 
comparing owner-operated with tenant farms.2o 
Looking at the input mix and output mix by tenure in Table 4.3, one may 
be surprised by the differences between the two regions. The scale of farming 
(improved acreage) was smaller for tenants than owners in the North Central 
region, as might be expected from the agricultural ladder thesis,  but it was 
higher in the Northeast. Indeed, the average value of tenant farms was actually 
greater than that of  owner-operated  farms in the Northeast. Similarly, the in- 
vestment  in machinery and livestock  on tenant  farms was far less than  on 
owner-operated farms in the North Central region but was about equal in the 
Northeast.  As  a consequence, North  Central tenants  had higher capital and 
land  productivity  and lower labor productivity  than owners,  while just the 
reverse held in the Northeast.  Tenants had  11 percent higher total factor pro- 
ductivity than owners in the North Central region,  but 4 percent lower total 
factor productivity than owners in the Northeast. Crop mix was also different. 
Tenants grew a greater proportion of corn, a smaller proportion of wheat, and 
produced a smaller share of animal products than owners in the North Central 
region, but  again these  comparisons are reversed  in the Northeast.*’ These 
figures suggest that the institution of tenancy operated very differently in the 
two regions. 
20. If we allocate hired hands available outside farms proportionally to the improved acreage 
of each farm, the downward bias of the labor input appears to be about 20 percent for owner- 
operated farms and 18 percent for tenant farms. The influence of the differential bias on the pro- 
ductivity comparison between owner and tenant turns out to be negligible. 
21. It is noteworthy that the Bateman-Foust sample does not cover urban townships, where the 
growth of labor-intensive market gardening led to an increase in tenancy, especially in the North- 
east. “High land values in connection with ready markets produced tenancy near the large cities, 
a condition of  land tenure almost unknown elsewhere in the North. Many of the truck farms were 
leased by  immigrants, who had  learned  gardening in Europe” (Percy W.  Bidwell  and John I. 
Falconer, History of  Agriculture in  the Northern United States, 1620-1860  [Washington, D.C., 
19251, p. 242). 143  Farm Tenancy in the Antebellum North 
Differences in crop mix and input composition by tenure status have been 
observed  in  other contexts,  and  explanations have  been  offered  for them. 
Lower livestock investment, emphasis on swine within the livestock category, 
and a higher share of corn in the total output of  tenants have all been inter- 
preted as rational utility maximizing behavior. The following interpretation is 
typical of the literature: “Since tenants were generally in a poorer capital po- 
sition, they were unable to invest in livestock to the same extent as owner- 
operators. Moreover, meat production provided a slower turnover on invest- 
ment than did grain production.  It took two to three years to fatten a steer for 
a market and about half the time for a pig.  . . . Renters were likewise reluc- 
tant  to make investments  in dairy cattle or sheep that  would be difficult to 
liquidate if their leases were not renewed.”22 This statement is based on im- 
plicit  assumptions about the state of  the capital  market, terms of  the lease 
contract, and attitudes toward risk. This is especially clear in our case since 
the Northeast showed a pattern almost contrary to what the quotation would 
predict.  Accounting for the behavior  of farmers in the Northeast requires a 
more elaborate theoretical model and a reevaluation of the farm-level data. 
4.2  A Model of the Farm-Rental Market 
The economic theory of farm tenancy was developed from various perspec- 
tives.  Some writers  have  emphasized relative  resource  endowments, while 
others have  given  more  weight to risk and transactions  costs. All  have  as- 
sumed that the contractual form is determined by a market process of interact- 
ing demand and supply, not merely  by custom or unilateral pressures from 
landowners. Thus, they provide not competing, but complementary explana- 
tions of tenure choice. Most previous empirical tests, however, have focused 
on a particular aspect of the market within the confines of a specific theory.23 
I develop and test a market-equilibrium  model that  simultaneously incorpo- 
rates many of the explanatory variables identified in previous research. 
Transactions in the rental  market  involve bilateral  contracts whereby  the 
landowner transfers to a tenant the right to use a unit of land in return for an 
agreed rental payment. We may assume that each owner has some “reservation 
rent,”  defined as the minimum rent he is prepared  to accept for leasing his 
unit, and that each prospective tenant farmer has some “limit rent,” defined as 
22. Winters, Farmers Wirhour Farms, p. 40. 
23. For a survey of the literature, see Alston and Higgs, “Contractual Mix in Southern Agricul- 
ture.” The recent empirical tests emphasizing  the tenure ladder are Reid, “White Land, Black 
Labor”; Wright, “Cheap Labor and Southern Texiles”; and Winters, Farmers Wirhour Farms. Risk 
sharing is emphasized in Higgs, “Race, Tenure, and Resource Allocation; “Patterns of Farm Rent- 
als”; and Competirion and Coercion. Enforcement and supervision costs are emphasized in Al- 
ston, “Tenure Choice in Southern Agriculture”; and Alston and Higgs, “Contractual Mix in South- 
ern  Agriculture.” The balance between  transaction costs  and  risk is emphasized in Phillip T. 
Hoffman, “The Economic Theory of  Sharecropping in Early Modern France,” Journal of  Eco- 
nomic History, 44  (June 1984), pp. 309-19. 144  Donghyu Yang 
the maximum rent he would be prepared to pay for a unit of  land.24  The lower 
the reservation rent of the owner and the higher the limit rent of the prospec- 
tive tenant, the greater the number of transactions that will take place in the 
rental market. The precise contract rent will be set at market-clearing level. In 
other words, the two-equation system, 
(1)  Td = Td(R -  RJ,  Td’ > 0 
can be solved for a reduced form, 
(3)  T = TW,,  R,) 
where T denotes the extent of tenancy (expressed as a probability at the indi- 
vidual level), R, the reservation rent, R, the limit rent, R the actual contract 
rent, and the superscripts d and s  denote the demand for and supply of tenant 
farmers respectively, with dTldR, <  0 and dTIdR, >  0. 
The problem now reduces to identifying the determinants of the reservation 
and limit rents. The landowner’s reservation rent reflects his choice between 
leasing the land and hiring farm laborers. It  will depend on his resource en- 
dowments and on the specific nature of the farming unit. The amount of agri- 
culture-specific  human  capital  the owner has, holding  other variables con- 
stant, determines how likely the owner is to operate the farm or to rent it. The 
reservation rent must be higher to compensate  for the lower earnings of the 
owner’s human capital in alternative employment. The accumulation of  man- 
agerial expertise, work stock, and tools were the most frequently cited forces 
enabling a farmer to move up the tenure ladder from wage hand to cropper, to 
share tenant, to fixed-payment renter, to owner-operator. The proxies for hu- 
man capital chosen from the manuscript census data are age, literacy, nativity, 
and length of residency. Physical capital was measured by the personal prop- 
erty variable, since it consisted mainly of livestock and implements. 
The nature of the farming unit influenced the landlord’s demand for tenant 
farmers through  two major channels: risk and transactions costs. Assuming 
risk-aversion,  the higher  the risk  attached to the operation of the farm, the 
lower the reservation rent. When the owner works his own farm, he bears all 
the risk. But he bears  only  a part of  the risk  when  he rents out the  farm. 
Variance of yields and prices provide a good measure of the risk, but the cross- 
sectional variance of farm income is not readily available. Crop mix may serve 
as a proxy. Corn was long regarded as less risky than wheat, its major alter- 
native. Wheat was vulnerable to disease, insects, and harsh weather, and had 
a shorter harvest period. As early as 1843, an English pamphlet to emigrants 
noted that corn “is not like other grain easily injured; but once ripe, there it 
stands, setting at defiance rain, frost, snow, and avery [sic] vicissitude of  cli- 
24. The model below follows the spirit of  J. M. Cume, The Economic Theory of Agriculrural 
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mate, often through great part of winter.”25  While the price of corn fluctuated 
widely (usually along with the price of hogs), it fluctuated no more than the 
price of  wheat. Major declines in the price of corn did not occur until 1861. 
Thus, the proportion of corn acreage in total cropland can be taken as an index 
of risk. The estimated value of corn divided by the value of total farm output 
was used, however, because the 1860 census did not collect crop acreage.26 
The costs of  hiring,  enforcing, and supervising wage labor probably in- 
creased disproportionately with the size of the work force, because the supply 
of enforcement and supervision was probably inelastic. “Tenant farming tends 
to increase where the average acreage per farm is large, and methods of culti- 
vation relatively simple.”27  The size of a farm (improved acreage) provides a 
measure of the cost of using hired labor. 
Thus,  the  reservation  rent  should  be  positively  related  to  age,  literacy, 
length of residency, personal property, and share of  corn in output, and in- 
versely related to improved acreage per farm. The effect of nativity is uncer- 
tain. 
The limit rent of a prospective tenant is more difficult to analyze, because 
the tenant’s alternatives to renting a farm include being hired as a farm worker, 
working outside agriculture, and buying a farm. I will confine my attention to 
the choice between renting and buying a farm, because I can only compare 
owners with  tenants. This limitation does not  create problems if  the labor 
market is similar across geographic regions, but may when explaining spatial 
variation in the tenancy rate (see the discussion below of Table 4.5). 
Relative resource endowments and the nature of a farm also play a role in 
determining the limit rent.  Potential farmers who were well endowed with 
managerial expertise, work stock, and implements would have a lower limit 
rent, while those with less human capital would desire advice and supervision 
from the landlord. The willingness of  potential tenants to pay  for these ser- 
vices would increase their limit rent. Assuming risk-aversion, the limit rent 
will be lower for the farm that involves riskier operations. Therefore, all the 
variables representing resource endowments and risk enter as arguments influ- 
encing the limit rent. 
25. William Oliver, Eight Months in Illinois: With Information to Emigrants (New Castle Upon 
Tyne, 1834), p.85, cited in Bogue, From Prairie to Corn Belt, p. 129. 
26. Corn production includes raising of feed for animals. However, since the share of animal 
products in the total output will enter the regression equation, the estimated coefficient of the corn 
share variable will reflect the marketed corn crop only. Table 4.3 above shows that the proportion 
of  marketable corn in gross corn output was higher for tenant farms than for owner-operated 
farms. Alternatively, the corn product net of animal feed can be used in the regression instead of 
the gross value of the corn output but the results would not be very different. 
27. Bizzell, Farm Tenancy in the UniredStares, p. 175. This relation is discussed at some length 
in ibid., chap.  14. Lee Alston, Samar K. Datta, and Jeffrey B. Nugent, “Tenancy Choice in a 
Competitive Framework with Transactions Costs,’’ Journal of Political Economy, 92 (Dec. 1984), 
pp, 1121-33,  suggest, however, that there may be economies of  scale in supervision up to a point. 
Lee Alston pointed out to me in a letter that the Midwest was characterized by higher percentage 
of kin-tenants. This would surely affect supervision costs but it is not clear how or if it influenced 
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Because leases had limited terms, the limit rent of a prospective tenant will 
be lower for the farm where the principal operation needed long-term invest- 
ment, for example building and maintaining the barns, silos, cribs, and fences 
necessary  for stock farming. I chose two variables to measure the impact of 
long-term  investment  requirements, namely,  the  share of.  beef  in  the  total 
value of  output and the share of total animal products (beef, pork, and dairy) 
in total production. The share of beef captures the longer time it takes to raise 
cattle than swine, and the share of total animal products captures the longer 
time involved in raising livestock compared with other food crops.28 
To sum up, the limit rent is expected to be negatively related to age, liter- 
acy, length of  residence, value  of  personal  property,  and share of  beef  and 
animal products in output, and positively related to the share of corn. Nativity 
is again of uncertain significance. 
Other forces affected the rental market that did not work directly through 
the demand or supply of tenant farmers. Among those discussed in the litera- 
ture are the price of  land per acre and the availability  of  public  lands.  The 
relation between land prices and tenancy is somewhat complicated to analyze, 
although the positive correlation between the two has been observed and dis- 
cussed for some time.29  To the extent that farm value capitalizes the productiv- 
ity of land and its proximity to market, and that prospective tenants perceive 
these facts, the limit rent will be higher.  However, the reservation rent of  the 
owner will also be higher.  Thus, farm value per acre should enter both the 
limit rent and the reservation rent equations. These two impacts will offset 
each other if the subjective evaluation of land productivity and proximity to 
market are the same for owner and tenant. 
If, for speculative or other reasons, the price of  a farm stays above its equi- 
librium level,  the farm will  not be purchased  or maintained by a bona fide 
owner-operator  who will  compare the land price to the prospective income 
stream. This implies that the speculator may have a lower reservation rent than 
an owner-operator. Because the rental market is not likely to be motivated by 
concerns about capital gains or the prestige of  landownership, one would ex- 
pect higher tenancy rates on overvalued farms. I used farm value per acre to 
capture this effect. 
28. When interpreting the estimated coefficients, these two variables should be considered to- 
gether, since they are closely related to each other. 
29. Early writers correctly identified the relationship, but their discussion frequently was lim- 
ited to a single aspect. For example, W.  J. Spillman and E. A. Goldenweiser, “Farm Tenantry in 
the United States,” in U.S. Department of Agriculture, Yearbook of Agriculrure,l9I6 (Washing- 
ton, D.C.,  1917), p. 335, tried to explain it with a version of the agricultural ladder hypothesis, 
stating that “where the value of  farm land is high a longer time is required for the tenant to 
accumulate the capital necessary for making a first payment on a farm than where it is  Iuw.”  See 
also Goldenweiser and Truesdell, Farm  Tenancy in rhe  Unired Stares. chap. 6.  Recently, Alston 
and Higgs, “Contractual Mix in Southern Agriculture,” contended that the more valuable the land, 
the more numerous would be wage workers relative to tenants. This is because, they argue, more 
valuable lands were given more supervision, and because the marginal cost of supervising wage 
labor is decreasing.  However, this influence, if  it existed, would have been dominated by  other 
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Availability of public lands is another factor claimed to influence tenancy. 
Where the settlement of desirable new land was in rapid progress, it has been 
argued, the opportunity for acquiring land was so great that there was little 
reason for the rental market to develop.  On the other hand, speculators and 
landlords who took advantage of the federal land policy leased out their lands 
to tenants.30  The direction of influence of the settlement level, thus, cannot be 
determined a priori, but the sign of the estimated coefficient may discriminate 
between the two opposing views. I took the proportion of farm land improved 
by  1860 to the ever-improved  agricultural land in the county as the measure 
of  farm settlement.31 
Solving the demand and supply equations and adding the two variables con- 
sidered separately yields a reduced-form equation which predicts that the rate 
(or probability)  of tenancy  vanes negatively with the age, literacy, length of 
residency,  and personal  property of  the  farm operator,  negatively  with  the 
share of  beef  and animal products  in output, and positively  with  improved 
acreage. The effects of  nativity,  share of  corn, value of  farm per acre, and 
settlement level are more difficult to determine. The expected sign of the share 
of  corn is ambiguous because risk decreases both the limit rent and the reser- 
vation rent. If  tenants were more risk averse than owners because they were 
less wealthy and had less access to credit, then the limit effect would dominate 
and a positive sign would  be expected.32  The value of  the farm also affects 
both the limit rent and reservation rent in the same direction.  If  speculators 
were the key players, the sign of  value per acre would be positive and the sign 
of settlement negative. 
4.3  Northern Tenancy Decisions in 1860 
Farm-level  regressions are shown in Table 4.4. The equations were esti- 
mated using the binary logit technique, with the dependent variable equal to 
zero if the farm was owner-operated and one if tenanted. Human capital vari- 
ables were specified in logarithms to allow for diminishing returns and, for 
the  same reason, the settlement  variable  was entered  as a quadratic.33 The 
interaction terms of age and residency with settlement were added to capture 
any differential in the effect of human capital over the settlement stage. 
In the regression  for the North  as a whole,  every  variable,  except  stock 
farming (beef share and the share of animal products) and nativity, is signifi- 
cant at the .05 level and has the expected sign. The sign of the interaction 
terms shows that age gained importance over the settlement stage, but length 
30. See the introductory part of the text for a related discussion. 
3  I. This measure is based on the procedure used by  Easterlin et al., “Farms and Farm Fami- 
lies.” The index was constructed from decennial census data by dividing the improved acreage in 
1860 by the improved acreage of  1870, 1880, 1890, 1900, 1910, whichever was largest. 
32. For a similar argument, see Higgs, “Patterns of  Farm Rental.” 
33. It was not entered in  logarithms because it is already a ratio variable constrained to fall 
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Table 4.4  Logit Regression of Farm-Level Tenancy 
~  ~~  ~~ 
North  Northeast  North Central 
Intercept 
Log (age) 
Dummy for literacy 
Dummy for born in 
state 
Dummy for foreign- 
born 
Dummy for born in 
English-speaking 
countries 
Log of length of resi- 
dency 
Personal property 
Log (age) X  settlement 
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-  0.4087*** 
-0.002300*** 
5,381 
-  1,623.09 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Dependent variable = 0 if owner, =  1  if tenant. 
Source: Computed from the Bateman-Foust sample. 
*Significant at the .I0  level. 
**Significant at the .05  level. 
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of residency did not. The North Central region follows the same pattern as the 
North as a whole, except that the interaction terms between human capital and 
settlement lose their significance. For the Northeast, however, the results are 
generally poor. All the human capital variables except literacy are insignifi- 
cant, and the size of the coefficient for the physical capital variable (personal 
property) is very small compared with that of the North Central region. The 
share of animal products has a positive sign, indicating that raising livestock 
other than beef cattle (probably swine) attracted tenants. 
The lack of significance for the stock farming variables indicates that the 
limited length of lease contracts may not have greatly influenced the demand 
by tenants for rental farms. A Department of Agriculture bulletin published in 
191  8  observed:  “The  landlord  almost  universally  furnishes  all  materials 
needed in repairing buildings and fences, and in making other permanent im- 
provements as required,  while the tenants furnishes all labor except skilled 
labor necessary for making the required repairs and improvements. The ten- 
ant, however, is commonly paid wages for work on extensive improvements, 
such as ditching, tile draining, building silos, etc. . . . In the case of exten- 
sive improvements the landlord may supply all labor while the tenant is re- 
quired to board the laborers  .”34  The same source reported that annual lease 
contracts were generally renewed repeatedly. 
Except  for the apparent  differences  in  the  age distribution and  length  of 
residency, there does not seem to be much evidence for an agricultural ladder 
in  the  Northeast.  Once farm characteristics  are controlled,  the relative  re- 
source endowment variables lose their explanatory power. One may infer that 
the  tenure  ladder  was  meaningful  only  in the  North  Central region,  where 
settlement was still in progress,  and that in the Northeast, where agriculture 
was already declining, farmers on the lower rung of the ladder were constantly 
drawn off by the increasingly attractive industrial labor market and by the lure 
of westward  migrati~n.~~  The average age of farm operators,  given in Table 
4.3, shows that there were fewer young farmers in the Northeast than in the 
North Central region. 
The value of farm per acre has a larger and more significant coefficient in 
the North Central region than in the Northeast.  This variable may have cap- 
tured the prevalence of land speculation in the newly settled area of the North 
Central region. The squared settlement variable has a significant positive sign 
in the equation for the North  Central region.  This result,  together with the 
significant positive sign of the land price variable, indicates that the speculator 
34. Wilcox, Lease Contracts used in Renting Farms on Shares, p. 21. See also Bizzell, Farm 
Tenancy in the United States, pp. 195-96; and Spillman and Goldenweiser,  “Farm Tenantry in the 
United States,”  pp. 343-46.  This may not apply to the period around 1860. 
35. For related discussions, see Alexander Field, “Sectoral Shifts in  Antebellum Massachu- 
setts: A Reconsideration,”  Explorations  in Economic History,  15 (Apr. 1978), pp. 146-71;  and 
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thesis cannot be easily  In the North Central region, tenancy, it ap- 
pears, is hard to explain with a monocausal theory. 
I now use the model of the farm-rental market to explain geographic varia- 
tion  of  the tenancy rate across townships.  Excluding  townships with fewer 
than five farms, the rate of tenancy varied from zero to a high of  74 percent. 
Table 4.5 shows the results of  the township-level regression~.~~  Coefficients of 
practically  all  variables have the expected  signs, and together they explain 
more than a half of the spatial variation  in the tenancy rate. As noted previ- 
ously, this  specification assumes a uniform  state of the labor market across 
geographic areas. 
The second equation of Table 4.5 takes into account variation in the labor 
market by including the wage rate.38  The higher the wage rate, the lower the 
limit rent of a prospective tenant will be, because the value of his labor in the 
alternative employment is higher. Likewise, the reservation rent of  a landlord 
will be lower, because the costs of hiring and keeping wage laborers will be 
higher. Thus, the direction of influence on the tenancy rate is ambiguous and 
will be determined by the relative sensitivities of  demand and supply in the 
rental market.39 
The inclusion of wages decreases the residual variance by about 6 percent- 
age points.  The highly  significant negative coefficient of  the wage  variable 
indicates that the tenant’s response was more sensitive to labor market condi- 
tions than the owner’s. 
4.4  The Productivity of Tenants and Owner-Operators 
The empirical  literature has not yet produced a consensus concerning the 
economic performance of  tenant  farming. Among  others,  Winters reported 
that grain yields were not less for tenants than owners in postbellum  Iowa. 
Lewis Gray, echoing others, noted that “the question whether tenants or owner 
36. The role of speculators can also be viewed in a more sanguine light. “We can rightly regard 
the operations of the speculator as a means of  sending capital to regions that were desperately in 
need of it” (Bogue, From Prairie ro Corn Belt, p. 45). 
37. Since the dependent variable is a proportion bounded by zero and one, 1 transformed it into 
the log of  the odds ratio, log [tenancy ratei(1 - tenancy rate)], and ran weighted regressions to 
correct for heteroscedasticity. The weight was (tenancy rate)  X  (1 -  tenancy rate)  X  (number of 
farms in the township). 
38. Agricultural wage rates for 1860 by state were taken from Stanley Lebergott, Manpower in 
Economic Growth: The American Record Since 1800 (New York,  1964), p. 539. 
39. The model of P.  K. Bardhan and T.  N. Srinivasan, “Cropsharing Tenancy in Agriculture: 
A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis,” American Economic Review, 61 (Mar. 1971), pp. 48-64, 
derives a positive relation between wage and tenancy rate. This came from an unusual property of 
their equilibrium solution: zero marginal product of land is retained with the concave production 
function of share tenants. David Newberry pointed out that their equilibrium is not only noncom- 
petitive but also unstable. Modified to meet the existence problem, “the final outcome will depend 
on the relative strength of  the two effects and cannot be predicted a priori” (David M.  G. New- 
berry, “The Choice of Rental Contract in Peasant Agriculture,” in Lloyd G. Reynolds, ed., Agri- 
culture in Development Theory [New Haven, 19751, p. 126). 151  Farm Tenancy  in the Antebellum North 
Table 4.5  Township-Level Regression of Tenancy Rate 
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Notes: Standard errors are in  parentheses.  Dependent variable  = log of  the odds ratio of  the 
tenancy rate. Weight = tenancy  X  (1 -  tenancy)  X  number of farms. 
Source: Computed from the Bateman-Foust sample. 
*Significant at the .I0  level. 
**Significant at the .05 level. 
***Significant at the .01 level. 152  Donghyu Yang 
farmers are the more efficient as measured by crop production per acre can not 
be  conclusively  answered  except  with  reference  to the particular  locality 
under consideration.” Roger Ransom and Richard Sutch claimed lower labor 
productivity, while Jon Moen calculated that the total productivity measure of 
tenants was greater than that of owners in 1880 in the cotton 
As Table 4.3 above shows, tenants had lower labor productivity and higher 
land, capital, and total factor productivity in the North as a whole and in the 
North Central region in 1860, while the opposite was true in the Northeast. In 
the North, total factor productivity of tenants was 6 percent higher than total 
factor productivity  of  owner-operators.  In the North  Central region  tenants 
were 11 percent more productive, but in the Northeast tenants were 4 percent 
less  productive.  Was  it  because  northeastern  tenants  were  subject to static 
Marshallian inefficiencies, while the North Central tenants enjoyed productive 
efficiency in the sense of  Cheung and Reid? Paradoxically, the similar pattern 
of  input mix and output mix of owners and tenants in the Northeast suggests 
direct supervision by landlords, yet it is here that tenants are less efficient. 
Agricultural productivity calculations have been widely employed to trace 
technological  change over time or to compare the performance  of  different 
agricultural regions. Whether in temporal or spatial comparison, differences 
in total factor productivity call for an explanation, which usually turns on the 
existence of  unmeasured inputs, changes in resource allocation, economies of 
scale, and so on. One way to approach the issue is to specify a production 
function containing  more inputs. For  example, Zvi Griliches introduced an 
education variable to represent labor-quality differentials and variables reflect- 
ing the output mix of different regions.41 
Table 4.6 reports the results of production-function  estimates. In addition 
to the conventional inputs of labor, land, and capital, the personal character- 
istics of  farm operators were added to capture labor quality and managerial 
experience. The nature of the farm was represented by output-mix variables 
(shares  of  corn, beef,  and animal  products),  scale of  operation  (improved 
acreage), and the settlement stage. 
The effect of  length of residency is not significantly different from zero in 
all three equations, probably  because of measurement errors. Personal char- 
acteristics generally have significant coefficients of expected  sign in the re- 
gressions for the North as a whole and for the North Central region.  Again, 
this is not true of the Northeast. The most important human capital variables, 
40. Winters, Farmers  Without Farms, chap. 5;  Lewis C. Gray et al.,  “Farm Ownership and 
Tenancy,” in U.S. Department of Agriculture,  Yearbook ofAgriculture, 1923 (Washington, D.C, 
1924), pp. 574-75;  Ransom and Sutch, One Kind ofFreedom; Jon R. Moen, “Changes in the 
Productivity of Southern Agriculture,  1860-1880,”  in Robert W.  Fogel and Stanley Engerman, 
eds., Without Consent or Contract: Technical Papers on Slavery (New York, 1991). I have reser- 
vations concerning the latter two citations, because the samples do not have adequate information 
to measure productivity by tenure. 
4 1. Zvi Griliches,  “Estimates of  the Agricultural Production Function from Cross-Sectional 
Data,” Journal ofFarm Economics, 45 (May 1963), pp. 419-28. 153  Farm Tenancy in the Antebellum North 
Table 4.6  Production-Function  Estimates with Tenure Dummy 
North  Northeast  North Central 
Intercept  3.5487*** 
Log (labor)  0.1874*** 
Log (capital)  0.2522*** 
Log (land)  0.1925*** 







state  (0.0190) 
Dummy for foreign-  -0.0834*** 
born  (0.0235) 
Dummy for born in  0.1067*** 
English-speaking  (0.0306) 
countries 
Dummy for literacy  -0.0754*** 
Dummy for born in  -0.0416** 
Log length of residency  0.0053 
(0.0103) 
Personal property  5.858~ 
(0.504~  10-5) 
Settlement  0.1780* 




(0.11  14) 
Animal-product share  -0.2822*** 
(0.0630) 
Dummy for tenant  -0.0397* 
(0.02  10) 
Dummy for Northeast  -0.1106*** 
(0.0560) 
Settlement’  -0.5015*** 
Corn share  0.1341*** 
Improved acreage  0.00161*** 
Beef share  -  l.0717*** 
Number of farms  8,556 
R=  ,450 
F-ratio  388.69 
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Notes:  Standard errors are in parentheses. Dependent variable = log of value of farm output. 
Source: Computed from the Bateman-Foust sample. 
*Significant at the .I0  level. 
**Significant at the .05 level. 
***Significant at the .01  level. 154  Donghyu Yang 
age and residency, lack significance in the regression for Northeast. It may be 
that younger farmers in the region shifted to the industrial sector or migrated 
westward and did not stay on the farm during the costly process of learning 
by doing. 
The size and sign of the coefficients of the settlement variables indicate that 
the productivity of a farm increased in the initial stage of settlement but slowly 
declined  thereafter.  This may  have  reflected  changing  external  economies. 
The sign of  the size of  a farm (improved acreage) is positive and significant 
for the North Central region and negative but insignificant for the Northeast. 
The sign on corn share is negative in the Northeast and positive in the North 
Central region, but the sign on animal-product share is positive in the North- 
east and negative in the North Central region. These results reflect the pattern 
of the comparative advantage by region (corn for the North Central, dairy for 
Northeast); specialization raises efficiency. 
It  appears  that  the  paradox  of  relatively  low  tenant  productivity  in  the 
Northeast and high tenant productivity in the North Central region can now be 
resolved. The coefficients on the tenant dummy all have negative signs, which 
are statistically significant for the North Central region and for the North as a 
whole.  In the North Central region, where the crude total productivity mea- 
sures gave tenants  l l percent higher productivity than owner-operators,  ten- 
ants seem to have been, other things equal, less productive than owners by 
about 7 percent. Tenants in the North Central region appeared more produc- 
tive because they operated farms which produced a higher proportion of  corn. 
This finding is hard to dismiss as a mere statistical artifact because the char- 
acteristics of the tenant farmer, such as age, length of residency, and the value 
of  personal  property,  all  imply  lower  agricultural  productivity,  unless  fully 
supplemented  by the landlord’s  supervision.  According to Allan G. Bogue, 
“In general, tenants were most common where the soils were highly produc- 
tive,”  and from a census monograph  by  Goldenweiser and Truesdell,  pub- 
lished in 1924, “tenants are likely to lease farms situated on better land, while 
the farms on poor soil are most likely to be operated by their  Like- 
wise, tenants in the Northeast appeared less productive because they operated 
farms that  produced  a higher proportion  of  corn and a lower proportion  of 
dairy product which went against the comparative advantage of the region. 
If  we rely on the results of the production-function  estimates, then, other 
things being equal, the tenants in the Northeast were as productive as owners, 
and those in the North Central region were approximately 7 percent less pro- 
ductive than owners. My conclusion  is that the substantial difference  in the 
input mix in the North Central region suggests the possibility of a Marshallian 
misallocation,  while  the  almost  identical  input  and output  mix  of  owner- 
operators and tenants in the Northeast suggests that in this region, supervision 
by landlords might have overcome any tendency toward inefficiency. 
42. Bogue, From Pruirie to Corn Belt, p. 66; Goldenweiser and Truesdell, Farm Tenancy in the 
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4.5  Conclusions 
Generalizations about northern farming that do not take interregional differ- 
ences into account are bound to be misleading. The characteristics of tenants 
compared with owners,  and of tenant  farms compared with owner-operated 
farms, were distinctly different in the North Central and Northeastern regions. 
In  the  North  Central  region  tenants  were  generally  younger  than  owner- 
operators and a higher proportion  were migrants from out of  state. Among 
those  who  were  foreign-born,  English-speaking  countries  were  less repre- 
sented among the tenantry. Tenant farms were smaller, more labor intensive, 
and  produced  relatively  more  corn than  wheat or animal products.  Within 
livestock  husbandry,  hog  farming was  more  common  among  tenants  than 
cattle raising  or dairy farming. In the Northeast, on the other hand,  almost 
none of these generalizations held. 
The decision to lease a farm was largely determined by economic factors 
such as relative resource endowments, risk, and transactions costs, although 
in the Northeast the effect of resource endowments assumed less importance. 
A good part of the geographic variation in the tenancy rate can be explained 
by these forces. But, at the same time, some effect from speculation  in the 
North Central region cannot be dismissed easily. 
Ownership  was  a stage that could be  reached  only after accumulating a 
stock of human and physical capital. In the North Central region, where the 
capital market and the communication network of farm-management knowl- 
edge might not have operated well, tenancy served as a stepping stone to farm 
ownership. On the other hand, in the Northeast, where younger farmers were 
constantly drawn from the farm, the agricultural ladder hypothesis performs 
less well.  Even six decades later, the pattern  seems to have been intact. “In 
the United States as a whole [in 19201, 42 percent  of the owner farmers re- 
ported no previous farm experience as wage hands or tenants.  . . . The per- 
centage is high in New England [59 percent], where tenancy is an unimportant 
step in the tenure ladder.”43  Thus, the institution of tenancy depended on the 
market environment where it operated. 
Throughout  the  North,  farm  characteristics  reflecting  risk,  transactions 
costs,  and the condition of the market for land were important determinants 
of tenancy. The emergence and dispersion of tenancy can be explained fairly 
well by the market-equilibrium model. The model, moreover, can be extended 
to incorporate the influence of the labor market. 
Tenants had lower labor productivity but approximately 6 percent  higher 
total  factor productivity  than  owner-operators.  However, after adjusting for 
characteristics of farm and farm operators, the superiority of  tenant farming 
disappears.  In other words,  tenants appeared more productive  because they 
rented more productive farms. The finding is more apparent in the North Cen- 
tral region, where the apparent 11 percent superiority in total factor productiv- 
43. Gray et al.,  “Farm Ownership and Tenancy,” p. 554 156  Donghyu Yang 
ity of tenants can be more than explained away by the characteristics of  the 
farms. Tenants in this region may have been about 7 percent less productive 
than owner-operators,  suggesting the possibility  of Marshallian  inefficiency. 
In  the Northeast,  on the other hand, the almost  identical  input  and  output 
mixes of tenants and owner-operators  suggest that supervision by landlords 
may have been more effective. On the whole, the findings imply that, although 
the institution of farm leasing functioned reasonably well, the higher produc- 
tivity exhibited by tenants in the crude comparisons originated in farm char- 
acteristics. 